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Introduction
Christopher J. Peters
The contributions to this volume address, from a variety of perspectives, the topic
of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court’s  faithfulness,  or  lack  thereof,  to  its  own  prior  
decisions.  That  topic  is  perennially  a  “hot”  one  in American law and legal academia, and periodically in American politics as well. It is inevitable that whenever a
new prospective Justice is nominated to serve on the Court, he or she will be
grilled extensively by senators about his or her views on stare decisis. 1
This sometimes-obsessive American focus on stare decisis owes much to the
Court’s   controversial   1973   decision   Roe v. Wade,2 which recognized a constitutional right to abortion and, in so doing, triggered a political and legal reaction that
continues to this day. At least since Ronald Reagan in 1980, Republican presidential candidates routinely have pledged, overtly or obliquely, to appoint Justices
who will vote to overturn Roe, while their Democratic counterparts have promised
to nominate Justices who will uphold that decision. Requirements of judicial ethics prohibit judges from announcing ahead of time how they are likely to rule in
some future case, so questioning in Court nomination hearings often employs the
general issue of stare decisis as a proxy for the specific question of whether the
nominee will vote to affirm or to overrule Roe (and other politically progressive
Court decisions from the 1960s and 1970s).
For its part, the contemporary Court has itself confronted the question of stare
decisis in a number of cases challenging Roe and other progressive decisions.
Sometimes the result has been respectful of precedent (and thus frustrating for political conservatives). For example, the Court famously (or infamously, depending
on  one’s  perspective)  declined  to  overrule   Roe in  1992’s   Planned Parenthood v.
Casey3―a decision much discussed in this volume―despite the recent accession
1

From the Latin stare decisis et non quieta movere (“to  stand  by  things  decided,  and  not  to  disturb  settled  points”).
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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to the Court of a majority of Republican-appointed Justices. And the Republicandominated Court subsequently reaffirmed the contested 1966 decision Miranda v.
Arizona,4 which required that criminal defendants be informed of their Fifth
Amendment   “right   to   remain   silent”   in   order   for   confessions   to   be   admissible  
against them.5
But the recent Court has not always been so apparently deferential to the norm
of stare decisis. In some other criminal-procedure contexts, the Court has overturned its own relatively recent pro-defendant rulings.6 The Court also has overruled politically progressive decisions in areas such as religious freedom and, perhaps most controversially, campaign-finance legislation.7 And, as I and others
have documented (see Friedman 2010; Peters 2008), the current Roberts Court has
been   especially   slippery   about   using   “stealth   overrulings”   (or   “underrulings”)   to  
gut precedents without formally rejecting them.
In the American legal academy, too, much recent discussion of stare decisis has
its roots in Roe. The contemporary rise of originalism as a prominent methodology
of constitutional interpretation can be traced, as an historical matter, to conservative   scholars’   reaction   during   the   1970s   and   1980s   to   Roe and other seemingly
nonoriginalist decisions; and with modern originalism has come a body of theory
challenging the legitimacy of stare decisis in constitutional cases. 8 This challenge
has spurred attempts by progressive defenders of these decisions to articulate justifications for precedent-following.9
Causally  speaking,  then,  American  debates  about  the  Court’s  use  of  precedent  
largely stem from, and tend to be overshadowed by, the political dynamics of Roe
and other contested progressive rulings. But it would be a mistake to assume that
the topic is irredeemably infused with partisan politics, or that it has only parochial significance. Whether and to what extent the Court (a) does and (b) should adhere to its own prior decisions are questions that have broad implications for gen4

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
6 See, for example, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), to hold that juries may
constitutionally consider victim-impact evidence). For an extensive discussion of Payne, see Colin Starger’s  contribution  to  this  volume  (Chapter  1).
7 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985), to hold that, with some restrictions, public schools may pay public schoolteachers to
teach in private religious schools); Citizens United v.  Federal  Election  Comm’n,  558  U.S.  310,  
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (overruling overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652 (1990), and McConnell  v.  Federal  Election  Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), to hold that
legislative restrictions on election-related spending by corporations violate the First Amendment).
8 On originalism as a reaction to Roe and other Warren Court and early Burger Court decisions,
see my discussion in Chapter 9,   Part   2.2.   For   a   description   of   originalists’   “special   difficulty”  
with constitutional stare decisis more generally, see Parts 1 and 2 of that chapter.
9 Probably the most prominent example is the work of Michael Gerhardt (e.g., 2011).
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eral jurisprudence and for democratic and constitutional theory, implications that
potentially echo well beyond the confines of American law and politics.
From  the  perspective  of  general  jurisprudence  or  legal  philosophy,  the  Court’s  
practices regarding stare decisis invoke persistent questions about the relationship
between general legal rules on the one hand and, on the other, correct results in
particular cases. Stare decisis purports to require that the Court adhere, at least
presumptively, to prior decisions it now believes to be incorrect. But what justification might (could) the Court have for doing that―for reaching the wrong result
just because some prior iteration of itself thought that result was the right one?
The problem is a version of the familiar tension between, as Justice Louis Brandeis influentially  put  it,  the  value  of  law  that  is  “settled”  and  the  value  of  law  that
is  “settled  right.”10
Larry Alexander, in Chapter 2 of this volume, associates this problem with circumstances   involving   “legal   transitions,”   that   is,   attempts   to   replace   suboptimal  
legal rules or systems of rules with more-optimal ones. Such problems of transition are endemic in a primarily common-law tradition like those in Britain, the
United States, and other former British colonies, in which a significant driver of
legal development is case-by-case decisionmaking by courts. But these questions
are hardly unique to common-law systems. Indeed, the underlying clash between
general rules and particularized justice extends well beyond contexts that can accurately be said to involve legal transitions. A version of it crops up, not just when
some authoritative body like the Supreme Court must determine whether to formally and overtly overrule one of its precedents, but anytime a judge or other legal
official must decide―perhaps surreptitiously―whether to obey or enforce a valid
legal rule or command she believes to be wrong. In this respect, the problem of
precedent is closely related to the profound mystery of legal authority, of whether
(and when, and why) those subject to the law ever have reason to obey it when
they think it will produce injustice. 11
As   a   matter   of   constitutional   and   democratic   theory,   the   Court’s   practices   of  
precedent touch on fundamental issues of separation of powers and democratic legitimacy. American-style judicial review famously presents what Alexander Bickel (1986,  16)  called  the  “counter-majoritarian difficulty”:  It  begs  the  question  why  
an elite group of nonelected, life-tenured Justices, supposedly acting in the name
of long-dead constitutional Framers, should be given the power to override the
products of the majoritarian political process. Many, perhaps most, plausible answers to this question depend at least in part on the idea that the Court will act in a
way that might be called principled12―that it will not decide based solely or pri10

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,  J.,  dissenting)  (“Stare
decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”).  Brandeis’s famous aphorism is referenced by
several contributors to this volume (see Colin Starger’s  Chapter  1  and  Randy  Kozel’s Chapter 8),
and his influential Burnet dissent is discussed at length by Starger (see Chapter 1, Part 2.2).
11 For a general discussion of this problem, see Peters (2011, 1-12, 33-67).
12 See, for example, Wechsler (1959).
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marily on the personal moral or political views of a majority of the Justices. From
one point of view, a willingness by the Court to adhere to past decisions, despite
the current view of most Justices that those decisions are wrong, is consistent
with, even constitutive of, this element of principle, while a willingness to overturn such decisions is corrosive of it. 13 To  others,  however,  the  Court’s  failure  to  
interpret the Constitution correctly in the first place represents the crisis of principle, one that can be resolved only by overruling the offending precedent to correct the error.14 Add  to  this  the  fact  that  the  Court’s  constitutional  decisions, unlike
its rulings in other legal contexts, cannot be reversed by ordinary legislation and
thus will stand―erroneous or not―forever, unless the Constitution is amended
(an exceedingly difficult process and thus an exceedingly rare occurrence) or the
Court itself overturns them.
These important issues of legal philosophy and democratic theory transcend the
nakedly political underpinnings of American debates about stare decisis, enlarging
the sphere of their relevance to encompass other legal systems and cultures. Participants in any legal system that allocates substantial authority to the process of
case-by-case court decisionmaking should care about whether, when, and why
those courts ought to remain faithful to their prior resolutions of similar issues.
Even a purely code-driven civil-law culture (a vanishing breed, if ever it existed at
all) has adopted a position in normative debates about the propriety of stare decisis―a position denying any judicial obligation to adhere to past decisions. Certainly the normative dynamics of stare decisis are salient in common-law or hybrid
systems that rely on courts to do much of the heavy legal lifting.
Moreover, with the international proliferation of bills of rights and constitutional judicial review that echo the American versions in many respects, more and
more legal cultures will need to engage with norms of constitutional adjudication,
including those governing the durability of judicial constitutional decisions. The
U.S. Supreme Court, and the legal and academic professionals that follow it, have
been grappling with these issues now for some two centuries. It hardly seems jingoistic to suggest that the participants in other, newer constitutional systems might
benefit from the experiences and answers the Court and its observers have to offer,
even if the primary benefit turns out to be one of negative example.
My hope as editor of this volume, then, is that it will prove interesting, perhaps
even useful, to audiences both in the United States and from other legal systems.
(This   is   the   notion   behind   the   book’s   publication   as   part   of   the   Ius Gentium series.) The volume arose from a live symposium held at the University of Baltimore
School of Law in March 2012. Each participant in that symposium has expanded
his or her remarks into a chapter in this book, and Randy Kozel, who did not par13

This sort of reasoning was a central element of the controversial justification of precedentfollowing offered by several Justices in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. See 505 U.S. at 864-69
(plurality  opinion  of  Kennedy,  O’Connor,  and  Souter).
14 This is the position taken by many constitutional originalists (see my discussion in Chapter 9).
It also seems to describe the view expressed by Larry Alexander in Chapter 2.

Introduction

5

ticipate in the symposium, also has added a chapter (Chapter 8). In selecting the
contributors, I looked first for scholars who I knew would write something original and provocative and write it well. I looked also for a diversity of viewpoints,
methodological approaches, and levels of seniority among the contributors. In
most cases the authors came first, their particular topics later: I allowed each author to choose what exactly he or she would write about, providing only general
guidance where it was requested. I hoped for a series of essays that would fit well
together yet stand each on its own as a meaningful contribution to our understanding  of  the  Court’s  relationship  to  precedent.  I  think  that  is  what  I  got,  although  of  
course the reader will have to judge for herself.
The essays begin with Colin Starger’s  entry  in  Chapter  1,  which  sets  the  stage
for  what  follows  by  exploring  the  Court’s  own  “precedent  about  precedent”―the  
development of its doctrine regarding whether and when it will adhere to its prior
constitutional decisions.15 Starger explains that, somewhat surprisingly, the Court
did not claim to have any doctrine of stare decisis at all for its first twelve or thirteen  decades―more  than  half  its  history.  Prior  to  the  early  twentieth  century,  the  
Court referred to stare decisis as simply a maxim of good judicial practice rather
than something on the order of a presumptively binding legal rule. Using graphical
“opinion  maps,”  Starger traces  the  Court’s  modern  doctrinal  approach  to  constitutional stare decisis back to Justice Brandeis’s  often-cited dissenting opinion in the
1932 Burnet v. Coronado Oil case,16 in which Brandeis meticulously catalogued
previous instances of constitutional overrulings, thus transforming stare decisis
from a commonsense question of wise practice to a doctrine-driven matter of legal
rules. Starger then illustrates how competing judicial attitudes toward constitutional  stare  decisis―a  “weak”  tradition,  allowing  for  overruling  solely  or  primarily on grounds of disagreement with the reasoning of the precedent case, and a
“strong”   tradition,  purporting   to  require  some  good  independent  reason  for  overruling―each  derive  rhetorical  force  from  Brandeis’s   Coronado Oil opinion. And
15

This phrasing of Starger’s―“precedent  about  precedent”―may itself become a fixture of the
Court’s  stare  decisis  doctrine.  In  April  2013,  Starger posted an abstract of what is now his Chapter 1 on SSRN (www.ssrn.com), an online scholarship database popular with American law professors. In his abstract, Starger referenced Payne v. Tennessee―a centerpiece of his analysis―and asked,   “does   the   Court’s   contemporary   ‘precedent about precedent’ have genuine
precedential value?”   Two   months   later,   in   June   2013,   near   the   close   of   its   Term,   the   Supreme  
Court decided Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, which overruled a 2002 decision in
holding  that  a  fact  that  increases  a  defendant’s  mandatory  minimum  sentence  is  an  element  of  the  
crime that must be proven to a jury. In dissent, Justice Samuel Alito cited Payne several times
and   closed   his   opinion   with   the   following   sentence:   “The   Court’s   decision   creates   a   precedent  
about precedent that may have greater precedential effect than the dubious decisions on which it
relies.”  133  S. Ct. at 2173 (Alito, J., dissenting). (Justice Sonia Sotomayor liked  this  “precedent  
about  precedent”  trope  so  much―though  she  didn’t  think  much  of  Alito’s  deployment  of  it―that
she repeated it in her Alleyne concurrence when replying to Alito’s  arguments.  133  S.  Ct.  at  2166  
(Sotomayor,   J.,   concurring).)   It’s   hard   to   avoid   the   comforting   conclusion   that   (at   least   some)  
Supreme Court Justices really do pay attention to (at least some) legal scholarship after all.
16 285 U.S. at 405 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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while  most  observers  look  to  the  plurality  opinion  in  1992’s  Planned Parenthood
v. Casey as the definitive contemporary exploration of stare decisis by the Justices
themselves, Starger identifies opposing opinions in a lesser-known case decided a
year earlier, Payne v. Tennessee,17 as the source of many of the arguments wielded
by adherents of both the weak and the strong traditions on the recent and current
Court.
Starger concludes   with   the   suggestion   that   the   function   of   the   Court’s  
“precedent   about   precedent”   is   more   rhetorical   than   constraining.   Justices―sometimes even the same Justice in different cases―seem to adopt the weak
or strong approaches to stare decisis in an unprincipled, results-driven manner.
Starger does not find this particularly troubling: He thinks consistency in even a
single  Justice’s  stare  decisis  jurisprudence is too much to expect, given the need to
balance continuity with change on a case-by-case basis. This (admittedly tentative) position is questionable; to acknowledge that the force of precedent should
vary with context is not to endorse a general approach to stare decisis that morphs
to  suit  a  Justice’s  preferred  substantive  results.
Nonetheless,  in  surveying  the  Court’s  own  professed  doctrine  of  constitutional
stare decisis―and exposing the soft spots and fissures in that doctrine―Starger’s  
analysis lays a useful foundation for both the normatively and the descriptively focused chapters that comprise the remainder of the book. Chapters 2 and 3 directly
confront some of the major normative issues. In Chapter 2, Larry Alexander
mounts a forceful (though somewhat qualified) normative attack on stare decisis
in constitutional cases. Alexander begins with the (admittedly debatable) premise
that a Justice ought not disobey the Constitution itself solely on the ground that
she believes implementing the Constitution will produce a morally incorrect or
suboptimal result. Assuming this is so, he asks, how could it then be the case that
a Justice should obey prior Court decisions that in effect disobey the Constitution
by  incorrectly  interpreting  it?  One  common  answer  is  that  the  Court’s  interpretations of the (written) Constitution are, or can become, themselves part of the (legally binding) Constitution, by virtue of widespread and sustained public acceptance of those interpretations. If this is so, then by obeying an earlier Court
decision that meets the relevant criteria of public acceptance―however erroneous
it may be as an interpretation of the previously existing Constitution―a subsequent Court is in fact obeying the Constitution as it now exists. Alexander is skeptical of this answer, however, because it seems to rely on public acceptance of an
erroneous Court interpretation with knowledge that the interpretation is erroneous,
a criterion Alexander thinks rarely will exist.
A second common answer is that overruling (some) erroneous constitutional
precedents would upset the expectations of those who have reasonably relied on
those precedents, with possibly disastrous results. (Alexander posits the example
of the Legal Tender Cases, which held in 1871, arguably incorrectly, that the Con-

17

501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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stitution permits the government to issue paper money. 18 Imagine a Court decision
overturning that precedent more than 100 years later.) Alexander doubts that obeying an erroneous precedent to avoid disastrous consequences is different in kind
from  disobeying  the   Constitution  itself  to  avoid  an  unjust  or  otherwise  “infelicitous”   result.   And he argues that even if the fact of reliance on an erroneous
precedent makes a sufficient moral difference, the Court could minimize or eliminate the harm to reliance interests by simply delaying the implementation of its
overruling decision for long enough to allow the system to adjust (e.g., by weaning itself off paper money) or, more likely, to allow for a formal constitutional
amendment pursuant to Article V to ratify the otherwise erroneous precedent. Only if the uncertainty caused even by a delayed overruling would be sufficiently catastrophic, Alexander suggests, does the Court have good reason to adhere to an
erroneous precedent.
Alexander then turns his attention to the arguments against overruling made by
the plurality in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, focusing in particular on the two
most  controversial  of  those  arguments.  “[P]eople have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in
society, in reliance on the availability of abortion,”  the  Casey plurality asserted,19
and overruling Roe would harm these reliance interests. But Alexander does not
think   this   sort   of   “reliance”   should   be   taken   seriously,   particularly   when   pitted  
against the importance of interpreting the Constitution correctly. Nor does he
agree with the Casey plurality’s  suggestion  that  harm  to  the  Court’s  own  authority,  
which  might  flow  from  the  public’s  perception  of  too-frequent overrulings, is sufficiently weighty to overcome the harm caused be erroneous constitutional interpretations.20
Alexander’s   arguments   might   be   challenged   on   a   number   of   points.   It   is   not  
self-evident, for example, that erroneous Court interpretations of the Constitution
must be understood by the public to be erroneous (and be accepted anyway) in order to become authoritative. Perhaps the public (or the body of legal officials―whichever group within American society has the authority to determine
what counts as law) has implicitly authorized the Court to render authoritative
constitutional decisions even if those decisions are, as an interpretive matter, incorrect, so long as the decisions meet certain other criteria―substantive acceptability to a large majority of the public over time, for example. If this is the case,
then subsequent Courts would have reason to obey erroneous prior interpretations
that meet the public-acceptance test.
Alexander also downplays the possible significance, to normative evaluations
of stare decisis, of uncertainty and disagreement about constitutional interpretation. It is this line of argument that Deborah Hellman takes up in Chapter 3. Hellman contends, against conventional wisdom in legal-philosophy circles, that
18

79 U.S. 457 (1871).
505 U.S. at 856.
20 See 505 U.S. at 861-69.
19
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judges have epistemic reasons to adhere to precedent―reasons   to   follow   a  
precedent on the basis that doing so is more likely than not doing so to generate a
correct decision. Most theorists have rejected epistemic justifications of stare decisis on one or both of two grounds. The first has to do with the conceptual mechanics of epistemic authority. Suppose a judge believes that the correct result in the
case she must decide is X. But suppose she is faced with an on-point precedent
that clearly dictates a different result, Y. And suppose she believes that the judge
that decided the on-point precedent is a better (more accurate) decisionmaker than
she is. (Imagine an inexperienced jurist faced with a precedent decided by Holmes
or Cardozo.) The judge may then have reason to change her mind and reach result
Y rather than result X in her case. The reason would be that someone she recognizes as an epistemic authority―the   éminence grise who decided the precedent
case―has  declared  Y to be the correct result. In this scenario, precedent has made
a  difference―but  in  a  persuasive  way,  not  in  an  authoritative  one.  The  judge  has  
reached a result consistent with the precedent, not because she believes she must
follow the precedent despite her disagreement with it, but because (thanks to her
respect for the wisdom of the precedential judge) she no longer disagrees with it.
The judge has not really obeyed the precedent at all; and thus the principle of stare
decisis itself is doing no real work.
Hellman argues, however, that a judge may have epistemic reasons to act in
obedience to a precedent, even if she lacks reason (at least decisive reason) to believe the precedent is correct. The legal system of which the judge is a part may
conclude that judges are more likely, on the whole, to make correct decisions by
following precedent than by relying solely on their own judgment, and it may establish a rule or other norm of precedent-following as a result. An individual judge
may then have reasons (of professional ethics or separation of powers) to follow
the rule dictated by her legal system and thus obey a precedent with which she
disagrees   in   substance.   Indeed   a   judge’s   recognition   of   her   own   fallibility   may  
give her reason to obey a precedent with which she disagrees, even absent a systemic rule requiring her to do so. These kinds of reason would be epistemic reasons, in the sense that they are based on the premise that judges are more likely to
reach correct results by following precedent than by not doing so.
Hellman also takes issue with the second common objection to epistemic justifications of stare decisis, which is in essence a normative one. Even if epistemic
reasons to follow precedent can exist as a conceptual matter (the objection goes),
there is no good cause to think that precedents actually are more likely to be correct than the unfettered judgment of the individual judge. After all, precedential
cases were themselves decided by (fallible human) judges; and often they were
decided many years ago, under moral assumptions (about gender roles, for instance, or racial hierarchy) that now seem benighted. Why should the present-day
judge subordinate her own best judgment to that of some earlier, morally backward court?
Hellman’s  answer  to  this  challenge  is  ingenious  and  largely  original.   The  primary epistemic value of precedent, she suggests, lies not in the supposed epistem-
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ic authority of the precedential decisions themselves, but rather in the checking
function served by the process of engaging with precedent. A presumptive norm
of precedent-following counterbalances the natural human tendency toward overconfidence by requiring judges to take opposing arguments (those of the precedential courts) seriously and to articulate good reasons for their disagreement with
those arguments. Judges are more likely to generate correct results under a norm
of stare decisis, not because the precedents themselves are likely to be correct, but
because the exercise of grappling with the precedents is likely to enhance the quality  of  judges’  decisionmaking.  More  conventionally  (and  more  tentatively),  Hellman also suggests that the precedents themselves are relatively likely to be correct―not   because   the   judges   that   decided   them   are   smarter   than subsequent
judges, but rather because precedents tend to be the products of a gradual, collective, Burkean, common-law process of testing and refinement over time.
Hellman thus   offers   the   framework   of   a   response   to   Alexander’s   skepticism  
about stare decisis. Alexander looks in vain for a convincing reason to prefer
wrongly-decided precedents over correct interpretations of the Constitution. But
Hellman points out that which constitutional interpretations are correct and which
are not, like most issues judges face, is almost always a matter of uncertainty and
contestation. Deference to precedent might be a reasonable response, at a systemic
level and perhaps on an individual level, to these persistent facts of uncertainty
and disagreement.
Hellman’s   defense   of   stare   decisis   is   hardly   unassailable,   of   course.   On   the  
conceptual level, the strength and, ultimately, the existence of an epistemic reason
to follow precedent is vulnerable to the very problem of disagreement that grounds
that reason in the first place. A judge who disagrees strongly with the merits of a
precedent has, on that basis, grounds to doubt the epistemic value of the
precedent; strong enough disagreement might justify (or seem to justify) rejecting
the precedent altogether. (This problem affects epistemic justifications of authority
more generally, and indeed I deploy it in Chapter 9 as part of my attack on what I
call  “Moral  Guidance”  accounts  of  constitutional  authority.)21
On the normative level,   it  isn’t  clear   how   squarely  Hellman’s  defense   fits  the  
unusual context of constitutional decisionmaking by the Supreme Court. Supreme
Court Justices tend to arrive on the Court with reasonably well-formed notions
about the law, and the constitutional cases they decide tend to carry a strong political valence. Against this backdrop, is it realistic to think that the requirement of
engaging with precedent often will trigger the kind of judicial self-reflection and
second-guessing  that  can  materially  improve  the  Court’s  decisionmaking?  Or  are  
Justices more likely to pay rhetorical lip service to stare decisis while actually deciding cases on ideological grounds, as Starger suggests in Chapter 1 (echoed by
Neal Devins in Chapter 5 and Frederick Schauer in Chapter 6)? Nor is it obvious
that Hellman’s  quasi-Burkean “many  minds”  argument  for  the  merits  of  precedent  

21

See Chapter 9, Part 7.3.
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carries the same force when applied to the relatively small sample size of the
Court’s  constitutional  case  law.
While  neither  Alexander’s  nor  Hellman’s  arguments  is  airtight,  however―as  if  
any   position   on   this   nuanced   and   contentious   question   could   be―their   chapters  
helpfully join, and frame, the overarching normative debate about the propriety of
stare  decisis  in  the  Court’s  practice.  In  Chapter  4,  Maxwell  Stearns brings to that
debate a straightforward descriptive insight: The easier it is to create a precedent,
the easier it will be to overrule that precedent. Stearns takes issue with the conventional wisdom among many American public-law scholars  that   the   Court’s  justiciability doctrines―standing   requirements   and   similar   limitations   on   who   may  
bring a constitutional challenge and when the challenge may  be  brought―are  indefensible impediments to the creation of valuable constitutional precedents. Justiciability requirements  limit  litigants’  ability  to  time  constitutional  challenges  to  
coincide with sympathetic membership on the Court or other favorable conditions.
Stearns points out, however, that if these litigation-timing impediments were relaxed, the resulting precedents would become less valuable, as they would themselves be more vulnerable to subsequent carefully timed challenges aimed at overruling them. Litigants bringing constitutional claims would get favorable rulings at
a lower cost, but those rulings would in effect be worth less. Stearns thus suggests
that justiciability barriers may actually be a good thing for litigants seeking valuable constitutional precedents. And he goes a step further, proposing that the Court
itself should be more reluctant to overrule precedents that were, for justiciability
reasons, more difficult to obtain.
Stearns might  be   stretching  an  “is”  into  an  “ought”   with  this  final  suggestion.  
The fact that the durability of precedent depends to some extent on the sturdiness
of justiciability barriers as a descriptive matter does not seem to imply any particular approach to stare decisis as a normative matter. Stearns’s  analysis  certainly  
might give us (normative) reason to oppose the relaxation of justiciability doctrines: If we want Court decisions to be relatively durable, we ought to continue
making  it  difficult  to  “time”  those  decisions  to  the  happenstance  of  an  ideologically favorable Court. (Of course, some litigants might prefer the inverse tradeoff: an
easier-to-obtain decision that also is shorter-lived.)   But   it’s   far   from   clear   that  
Stearns’s   analysis   identifies   a   (normative)   reason   for   the   Court   itself   to   respect  
precedent.  After  all,  the  Court’s  treating  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  a  precedent  as  
a reason not to overrule it would seem to produce a windfall for the litigants who
obtained that precedent: They would be getting the benefit of both the (new) justiciability barriers  to  the  Court’s  reconsideration  of  the  precedent and the (original)
justiciability barriers  to  getting  the  precedent  in  the  first  place.  Shouldn’t  the  former be enough?
Indeed, one might reasonably derive a very different normative message from
Stearns’s   penetrating   descriptive   analysis.   If   justiciability requirements make it
hard   to   obtain   a   Court   decision―including   a   decision   overruling   a   prior   decision―what  then  is  the  necessity  of  additional  barriers  to  overruling? Perhaps the
practical obstacles to overruling (including the difficulty, given justiciability doc-
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trines, of timing a challenge to coincide with an ideologically sympathetic Court)
are sufficient to foster consistency, predictability, and other rule-of-law values
without a supplementary norm of stare decisis. 22
Stearns’s  analysis  thus  provides  a  useful  segue  to  the  chapters  that  follow.  His  
empirical focus on the process of constitutional litigation writ large presages both
Neal Devins’s  essay  in  Chapter  5,  which  examines  the  relationship  between  ideological coherence on the Court and respect for stare decisis, and Frederick Schauer’s  contribution  in  Chapter  6,  which  suggests  that  the  realities  of  adjudication  inevitably   obscure   the   Court’s   actual   practices   regarding   stare   decisis. And by
placing stare decisis within a larger context that also features other prominent adjudicative norms, Stearns foreshadows the themes of Chapters 7 through 9, each of
which  engages  the  relationship  between  the  Court’s approach to stare decisis and
its methodologies of constitutional interpretation.
In Chapter 5, Devins uses the insights of social psychology and the evidence of
history to support the somewhat intuitive   proposition   that   “coherent”   Supreme  
Courts―those   featuring   a   majority   of   Justices   who   agree   on   crucial   issues―are  
far more likely to overrule precedents, and to aggressively attempt to create broad
precedents, than are   “incoherent”   Courts. Devins explains the social-psychology
dynamics that contribute to the formation (or absence) of coherent Court majorities. He then surveys three historical periods to illustrate the divergent behavior of
coherent versus incoherent Courts. The post-1936 New Deal Court (1937-1953),
Devins shows us, was highly coherent on most issues (thanks to a flurry of appointments by Roosevelt) and thus ambitious in both overturning precedent and
establishing broad holdings intended to bind future Courts. The Warren Court
(1953-1968) was mostly incoherent and cautious before 1962, dominated (at least
in national-security cases) by the centrist Justices Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan II, but became coherent thereafter with the appointments of Justices
Arthur Goldberg (replaced a few years later by Abe Fortas) and Thurgood Marshall, generating most of its still-influential decisions during that period. In contrast, the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) was incoherent on most issues, controlled
(like the early Warren Court) by two centrist swing Justices (Sandra Day
O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy). This incoherence helps explain the Rehnquist
Court’s   failure,   previously   discussed,   to   overrule   Roe and Miranda, and its relatively minimalist rulings on religious freedom, affirmative action, and other con22

Of course, a cynic might respond that a Court (or individual Justice) that is inclined to ignore
stare decisis to achieve results it desires will also be inclined to ignore justiciability barriers to
those results. Such a Court or Justice would find ways around justiciability requirements in order
to decide cases involving challenges to disfavored prior decisions, and then would find ways
around stare decisis norms in order to overturn those decisions. Justiciability doctrines would not
be sufficient to protect rule-of-law values against this kind of results-driven behavior; but neither
would a stare decisis norm. It may nonetheless be the case, however, that other practical obstacles to overruling―including  the  fact  of  relatively  infrequent  turnover  in  the  Court’s  membership―would continue to serve the rule-of-law values even in the face of purely results-driven
behavior by the Court.
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troversial topics. Finally, Devins offers a preliminary assessment of the Roberts
Court (2005-present) as similarly incoherent and thus for the most part similarly
cautious and modest.
On its surface, Devins’s  study  suggests  that  stare  decisis  exerts  very  little  actual  
normative constraint on the Court. If the Justices really felt constrained by
precedent, after all, their patterns of overruling would not seem to depend so heavily on extraneous factors such as substantive ideological coherence among the
Court’s   membership.   Digging   a   little   deeper, however, reveals some interesting
nuance in the descriptive conclusions one might draw from Devins’s  essay.  Incoherent Courts seldom directly overrule precedent; but, as Devins notes, they sometimes  engage  in  “stealth  overrulings,”  that  is,  decisions  that  contradict  the  logic  or  
reasoning of a precedent or severely restrict its scope without formally overruling
that precedent.23 This suggests at least that stare decisis exerts a sort of in terrorem
influence on the Justices, causing them to be wary of being seen to overrule precedents (if perhaps not of actually overruling them). And Devins’s  analysis reveals
an intriguing ex ante attitude toward the effects of precedent on the part of both
coherent and incoherent Courts. Coherent Courts attempt to establish broadly
binding precedents; incoherent Courts avoid doing so by rendering minimalist decisions. A Court that believed stare decisis to be unconstraining would hardly consider the potential precedential effects of its own rulings on future Courts.
One comes away from Devins’s  essay,  then,  with  a  sense  that  most  Justices’  (or  
at   least   the   typical   Justice’s)   normative   attitudes   toward   precedent   are   complex  
and ambivalent. Frederick Schauer’s  contribution in Chapter 6 is unlikely to dispel
this impression. Schauer is interested in whether we can reliably know, as a descriptive  matter,  just  what  the  Justices’  normative  attitudes  toward  precedent  really are. Considerable political-science research over the past two decades suggests
that the Court is driven primarily by results-oriented ideology, by socialpsychology dynamics (like those explained by Devins), or by some similar
mélange  of  “attitudinal”  factors,  and  virtually  not  at  all  by  allegiance  to  stare  decisis. Schauer points out, however, that these studies all share a fundamental weakness: They examine only the cases the Court actually decides, which, it turns out,
are unlikely to be cases in which a stare decisis norm might matter. If it were true
that the Court actually adhered to stare decisis (and if this adherence were generally known), then cases challenging precedents would rarely come before the Court:
Thanks  to  the  “selection  effect,”  disputants  would  not  think  it worthwhile to bring
such presumptively hopeless cases in the first place, or (more rarely) they would
bring them unsuccessfully and not appeal them, or (more rarely still) they would
appeal them but not seek review by the Court. The cases that made it to the Court,
then, would almost exclusively be close cases―cases in which there is no onpoint precedent, or in which the applicable precedents cut in opposite directions.
And these are precisely the kinds of cases in which a stare decisis norm, if it ex23

Devins cites Friedman (2010) and Peters (2008), which (as mentioned above) both explore this
phenomenon  of  “stealth  overruling”  or  “underruling.”
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isted, would have the least effect (and thus would not be revealed in empirical studies).
Schauer thus concludes that if there is a meaningful stare decisis norm on the
Court, it would not show up in empirical research; or, to put it another way, the
political-science consensus that there is no such norm cannot be trusted. And
Schauer notes a further complexity: The selection effect he discusses itself relies
on  the  existence  of  information  about  the  Court’s  attitudes  toward  stare  decisis.  If  
the selection effect is to winnow away cases governed by on-point precedents,
then litigants, their lawyers, and lower-court judges must believe that the Court is
in fact unlikely to overturn those precedents. But, since empirical research seems
incapable of revealing whether the Court actually respects stare decisis, these participants (and thus the selection effect) are operating without good information
about the likely consequences of their decisions. The phenomenon Schauer portrays approaches the status of paradox: The selection effect renders it impossible
to know whether the Court adheres to stare decisis, but that same selection effect
depends for its operation on a widespread belief that the Court adheres to stare decisis.
Schauer concludes by suggesting a way around the near-paradox: The Court
could deliberately signal its respect for stare decisis, by (for example) frequently
accepting cases that challenge precedents with which a majority of the Court is
known to disagree and then affirming those precedents. Schauer asserts, however,
that the Court has not done this and seems unlikely to―a conspicuous failure that,
like   the   celebrated   dog   that   didn’t   bark,   itself   strongly   implies   that   the   Court  
doesn’t  really  respect  stare  decisis  after  all.
Schauer’s  argument  from  the  selection  effect is a powerful rejoinder to the tooeasy conclusions of many academics (mostly, but not exclusively, political scientists)  that  the  Court’s  invocation  of  stare  decisis  is  nothing  but  a  smokescreen  for  
results-oriented decisionmaking. I suspect, though, that there is more (and moreaccurate)  information  available  about  the  Court’s  actual  practices  regarding  stare  
decisis than Schauer acknowledges, if not of the type or the level of certainty that
the political-science research implies. The Court does sometimes overrule its prior
decisions (even relatively recent ones), and it does sometimes affirmatively decline to overrule its decisions, as in Casey. These overt acts of overruling or not
overruling  provide  some  direct  evidence  of  the  Court’s  views  about  stare  decisis.  
Their existence, moreover, means that the selection effect does not weed out every
case controlled by an on-point precedent. And yet there are many precedents that
are rarely or never challenged: decisions that are longstanding and wellestablished,  even  if  they  remain  controversial  in  certain  quarters  (1966’s  Griswold
v. Connecticut,24 recognizing a constitutional right to use contraceptives, comes to
mind), and (at the other end of the spectrum) recent decisions with no intervening
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change  in  the  Court’s  ideological  makeup  (such  as  2010’s  Citizens United).25 The
conjunction of these phenomena suggests that lawyers, litigants, and lower-court
judges share a general professional sense that the Court will respect some sorts of
precedents and may be willing to rethink others. Like many things about the law,
the constraining effects of precedent may flow less from formally stated norms
than from informal conventions and understandings.
Schauer, Devins, and Stearns each grapple in different ways with empirical
questions   about   the   Court’s   relationship   to   stare   decisis.   The   book’s   final   three  
chapters reassert a normative focus, one that encompasses perhaps the most vigorous debate about precedent in current American legal scholarship: its compatibility with certain approaches to constitutional interpretation, in particular originalism. Participants in this debate usually assume that interpretive methodology
trumps   stare   decisis,   so   that   one’s   views   about   constitutional   stare   decisis   must  
follow   from   one’s   views   about   constitutional   interpretation   rather   than   the   other  
way around. In Chapter 7, Chad Oldfather cleverly subverts this typical assumption by imagining a world in which stare decisis norms apply to interpretive methodologies―that is, in which the Court is required to give precedential effect, not
merely to the result of a prior constitutional decision, but also to whatever method
of interpretation the prior Court used to reach that decision.
This is not in fact the world in which the actual Court operates, and Oldfather’s  
thought experiment suggests a good reason why.   A   regime   of   “methodological  
stare  decisis,”  Oldfather explains, would commit the Court to following the same
interpretive approach in some very broad swath of cases―perhaps   every single
case involving constitutional interpretation (that is, every constitutional case) or,
only slightly less broadly, every case involving the interpretation of some subset
of constitutional provisions that can meaningfully be distinguished from some
other subset (e.g., structural vs. rights provisions). Of course there are institutional
impediments to such a broad methodological commitment, most prominently persistent disagreement within the Court itself (and sometimes within individual Justices) about which methodology is the best or correct one. And there are serious
structural impediments as well, as Oldfather points out. Committing to a single interpretive methodology, once and for all, as the result of a single case would place
enormous pressure on the Court to get it right in that case, something the Court is
extraordinarily unlikely to do. Normally we expect courts deciding issues of first
impression to consider carefully the likely impact of their decisions on future similar  cases,  but  the  set  of  “future  similar  cases”  in  the  context  of  constitutional  interpretation will be much too large for this task to be feasible. The Court, then, is
very likely to get the methodological choice wrong, or at least to be perceived by
future Courts as having gotten it wrong, which will put substantial pressure on
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these future Courts to overrule the methodological precedent―thus undermining
the supposed rule-of-law values thought to justify stare decisis.
The absence of a norm of stare decisis with respect to interpretive methodologies, Oldfather thus concludes, is not surprising and probably is a good thing.
(Oldfather draws a contrast with the application of stare decisis to other aspects of
constitutional  methodology  often  referred  to  as  “decision  rules”―doctrinal heuristics for applying the Constitution to particular cases,  such  as  the  familiar  “tiers of
scrutiny”   in   equal-protection and due-process jurisprudence. Because these decision rules can be cabined within the boundaries of particular constitutional provisions. Oldfather explains, they do not pose the structural problem of radically unpredictable consequences that interpretive stare decisis would present.)
We might wonder whether Oldfather is being a bit too pessimistic about the
feasibility of a clause-driven approach to interpretive methodology―an  approach  
by which the Court would settle on fixed interpretive methodologies, but could
choose different methodologies for different constitutional provisions (e.g., originalism for the Due Process Clause, living-constitutionalism for the Free Speech
Clause, and so on). Clause-bound interpretative stare decisis might not pose significantly greater foreseeability problems than tiers of scrutiny and other provision-specific decision rules. Of course, many Justices (such as Justices Thomas
and Scalia on the current Court) probably would deny the propriety of divvying up
interpretive methodologies among different parts of the Constitution; originalists,
at least, tend also to be universalists.
In any event, if Oldfather is right about the unworkability of a unitary approach
to interpretive methodology, then his conclusions dovetail with those of Randy
Kozel in Chapter 8 to suggest that the Court will not soon endorse either an overarching interpretive philosophy or a comprehensive approach to stare decisis. Kozel argues that the questions of interpretive methodology and stare decisis are unavoidably   bound   together:   One’s   preferred   interpretive   method   will   affect   one’s  
conclusions about whether and when to follow precedent. Some aspects of the
precedent question clearly are independent of interpretive method, such as the
benefits of continuity (on the one hand) and the costs of incoherence in the law
(on the other). Kozel asserts, however, that other aspects of the question depend
for their resolution on a choice of interpretive method. Many originalists, for example, see nonoriginalist interpretation as, in essence, disobedience to the Constitution, and as such they contend that incorrect precedents must be overruled regardless of the rule-of-law costs of doing so. Other originalists distinguish
between nonoriginalist precedents, accepting that some (those that err on the side
of giving democratic government too much power, for example, or those that have
attained supermajoritarian approval) need not or should not be overruled despite
their incorrectness. And of course many nonoriginalists―such  as  those who take a
common-law approach to the development of constitutional law―consider (some)
Court decisions to be part of the meaning of the Constitution itself, even if those
decisions are inconsistent with the original meaning of the document. The ques-
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tion of the costs of following precedent thus often turns, Kozel argues, on the
question of which interpretive methodology one adopts.
As Kozel notes, an important consequence of this interdependence between interpretive methodology and stare decisis is the impossibility of a coherent approach to stare decisis on a methodologically pluralistic Court. Justices disagree
amongst themselves about proper approaches to constitutional interpretation, and
some individual Justices even claim to reject allegiance to any particular interpretive methodology at all. This fact of interpretive pluralism, which seems likely to
remain the rule into the indefinite future, probably explains why the Court focuses
almost entirely on interpretation-independent considerations (such as reliance,
workability,  and  the  Court’s  reputation  for  principle)  when  it  discusses  stare  decisis in decisions like Casey.
Kozel thus suggests that the Court will not settle on a comprehensive approach
to stare decisis unless its members agree on a unitary approach to constitutional
interpretation. And Oldfather offers reasons why the Court is unlikely to commit
to  a  unitary  interpretive  approach.  The  upshot  is  a  sense  of  pessimism  (if  that  isn’t  
too strong a word) that the Court will ever adopt coherent approaches to either
constitutional interpretation or constitutional stare decisis.
My own contribution in Chapter 9 continues the general project begun by Kozel of drawing normative connections between constitutional interpretation and
stare  decisis.  I  don’t agree with Kozel on every point: I am not convinced, for instance, that an assessment of the costs of stare decisis, properly understood, depends in part on the interpretive methodology one favors. Those originalists who
equate nonoriginalist interpretation with constitutional disobedience (termed
“structural”  originalists  by  Kozel) reject allegiance to nonoriginalist precedent in
all or nearly all circumstances, not because anything in their methodology requires
them to do so, but rather because they have made a judgment that constitutional
obedience is imperative no matter what its costs. This is a judgment about a duty
to obey constitutional law, not about how constitutional meaning should be identified.  For  their  part,  “living  constitutionalists”   who  think  that  some  nonoriginalist  
precedents nonetheless comprise part of constitutional meaning do not favor allegiance  to  “incorrect”  constitutional  decisions  as  a  result;;  they  simply  disagree  with  
originalists  regarding  what  a  “correct”  decisions  is.  One’s  theory  of  interpretation  
qua theory of interpretation cannot tell us, without more, how that theorist should
feel about stare decisis.
I think Kozel is quite right, however, to suggest that we look beneath both interpretive methodologies and approaches to stare decisis for their normative underpinnings. I take up this task in Chapter 9, arguing that interpretive methodologies and approaches to stare decisis both must stand or fall as implications of some
foundational theory of constitutional authority―of why the Constitution deserves
our obedience in the first place. I begin by deconstructing the claim made by some
originalists   (the   “structural”   originalists   described   by   Kozel) that their preferred
methodology is especially incompatible with constitutional stare decisis. This
“special  difficulty with  precedent,”  I  contend,  can  be  explained  (if  at  all)  only  by  
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reference  to  an  account  of  the  Constitution’s  binding authority. I then assess four
existing accounts of constitutional authority to determine whether any of them implies both originalism and a distrust of stare decisis. While three such accounts―which I term, respectively, the Values Imposition, Consent, and Moral
Guidance accounts―can  in  theory  support  originalism and motivate a rejection of
stare decisis, I argue that none of these accounts is both normatively and descriptively plausible. A fourth account, Dispute Resolution, appears more plausible, but
I contend that it implies neither strong originalism nor a rejection of stare decisis. I
conclude that neither thoroughgoing originalism nor a strong distrust of precedent
is supported by a plausible account of constitutional authority.
To put the point slightly differently: I argue in Chapter 9 that a convincing
theory of why the Constitution binds us implies at least an openness to the possibility that the Court should itself be bound, if only presumptively, by its prior decisions. Constitutional authority permits constitutional stare decisis (and, not incidentally, rejects robust originalism in constitutional interpretation). These
conclusions   will   be   controversial,   and   I’m   certain   my   arguments   have   many  
weaknesses. A disadvantage―or perhaps an advantage―of editing a volume to
which one also contributes a chapter is the practical impossibility of critically assessing   one’s   own   entry. I   won’t   even   attempt   the   task,   leaving   it   instead   to   the  
reader, whom I hope will benefit from this collection of essays as a whole despite
the undoubted flaws in my contribution to it.

* * *
The efforts and encouragement of many people made this volume possible, and I
am grateful to all of them. A succession of three Deans at the University of Baltimore School of Law―Philip Closius, Michael Higginbotham, and Ronald
Weich―provided material and monetary support in various forms for the book
and the live symposium from which it arose. The members of several faculty
committees approved summer stipends that were used in part to prepare this book.
Of course the book would not exist without the outstanding efforts of its contributing authors, most of whom also spoke at the symposium. My UB colleagues Kimberly Brown, Nienke Grossman, and Michael Meyerson generously agreed to
moderate panels at that symposium, and Laurie Schnitzer did much of the heavy
logistical lifting for the event. Participants in a faculty workshop at UB, particularly José Anderson, John Bessler, Kim Brown, Gregory Dolin, Garrett Epps, and
Colin Starger, offered helpful comments on my chapter; John Bessler and Mortimer Sellers deserve my thanks for organizing the workshop. At a Constitutional
Law Colloquium at the Loyola University School of Law in Chicago, I received
invaluable feedback and advice on my then-nascent chapter from Ian Bartrum,
Randy Kozel, Lee Strang, and Rebecca Zietlow. I also am grateful to the aforementioned Tim Sellers for agreeing to include the book in the Ius Gentium series
that he edits for Springer, and to Neil Olivier and Diana Nijenhuijzen at Springer
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for their editorial guidance. Perhaps the most crucial contribution to this book was
that of Emily Kolas (UB Class of 2013), who almost singlehandedly citechecked
and formatted the text, much of it after her graduation and while she was studying
for the Bar. And as always, I am profoundly thankful for the love and support of
my wife, Trish Webster, and of our families.
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